



Constitutional Implications of Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024 on the Separation of National and Regional Elections

Ahmad¹, Rahmat Teguh Santoso Gobel², Yassine Chami³

¹ Faculty of Law, Universitas Negeri Gorontalo, Indonesia, Email: Ahmad_wijaya@ung.ac.id

² Faculty of Sharia, IAIN Sultan Amai Gorontalo, Indonesia, Email: rtsg@iaingorontalo.ac.id

³ Abu Dhabi University, Uni Emirat Arab, Email: yassine.chami@adu.ac.ae

Article Info

Submitted: 8th October 2025
Accepted: 30th December 2025
Published: 31st December 2025

Keywords:

Constitutional Court Decision;
Separate Elections;
Constitutional Implications;
Electoral Simultaneity.

Corresponding Author:

Ahmad, E-mail:
Ahmad_wijaya@ung.ac.id

DOI:

10.24843/JMHU.2025.v14.i04.
p11

Abstract

The Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024 signifies a fundamental shift in the design of electoral simultaneity in Indonesia, mandating the separation of national and regional elections starting in 2029. This article analyzes the constitutional implications of this decision on the presidential system, regional governance, electoral administration efficiency, and the quality of democracy. Employing a normative juridical approach, the study finds that the ruling responds to the excessive workload of electoral organizers and the potential decline in electoral quality caused by the former "five-ballot" system. Nevertheless, the decision has also triggered debates concerning the judicial consistency of the Constitutional Court compared to its previous rulings and the implications for the legislature's open legal policy. The article concludes by emphasizing the urgency of comprehensive electoral law reform and the need for constitutional dialogue among state institutions to develop a more adaptive electoral system and safeguard the quality of future democratic processes.

1. Introduction

General elections (Pemilu) serve as a vital instrument within Indonesia's democratic system, functioning as both a manifestation of popular sovereignty and a mechanism for orderly and peaceful leadership transitions.¹ Since the 1998 Reform Era, Indonesia's electoral simultaneity design has undergone a significant evolution from initially separating national elections (presidential and legislative) from regional elections (Pilkada),² to adopting a full simultaneity model as regulated under Law No. 7 of 2017

¹ Dewanto Wishnu, "Tinjauan Hukum Implementasi Sistem Demokrasi Pancasila Melalui Pemilihan Umum Langsung Di Indonesia" (other, Universitas Tama Jagakarsa, 2017), <http://digilib.iblam.ac.id/id/eprint/153/>.

² Puji Purnama Sari, "Analisis Komparasi Terhadap Efektivitas Penyelenggaraan Pemilu Serentak Antara Indonesia Dan Brazil" (undergraduate, IAIN Parepare, 2024), <https://repository.iainpare.ac.id/id/eprint/8451/>.

concerning General Elections.³ This transformation reflects a constitutional effort to strengthen the presidential system and improve the efficiency of electoral democracy in Indonesia.⁴

The implementation of the five-ballot simultaneous election system in the 2019 and 2024 general elections has generated a range of systematic problems that threaten the quality and integrity of electoral administration. The workload faced by election organizers became overwhelming from the national level down to the local polling stations (TPS) resulting in serious fatigue among officers, even leading to fatal incidents. This condition not only deteriorated the quality of election implementation but also led to voter fatigue and fragmented voter focus due to the overwhelming complexity of candidate choices within a single electoral moment.⁵

Specifically, the five-year tenure of national election organizers has become inefficient and ineffective, as their core responsibilities only span approximately two years of actual election activity. Operational challenges include logistical constraints, the complexity of multi-level governance coordination, and the increased risk of human error due to disproportionate workloads. Furthermore, the full simultaneity system has raised concerns regarding conflicts of interest between national and local political agendas and diminished the quality of political campaigns and civic education, as public attention becomes excessively fragmented.⁶

As a judicial response to these systemic problems, the Constitutional Court issued Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024, ordering the separation of national and regional elections starting in 2029. This decision represents a constitutional intervention grounded in considerations of electoral effectiveness, democratic quality, and the protection of citizens' constitutional rights.⁷ The ruling mandates a fundamental restructuring of Indonesia's electoral architecture by separating the conduct of national presidential and legislative elections from that of regional head elections.⁸

³ Moch Nurhasim, "Paradoks Pemilu Serentak 2019: Memperkokoh Multipartai Ekstrem Di Indonesia," *Journal of Political Research* 16, no. 2 (2019): 2, <https://doi.org/10.14203/jpp.v16i2.819>.

⁴ Lusin Tammu, "Analisis Yuridis Konsep Pemilihan Umum Serentak Di Indonesia," *DOKTRINA: JOURNAL OF LAW* 6, no. 2 (2023): 118–39, <https://doi.org/10.31289/doktrina.v6i2.10023>.

⁵ Mahkamah Konstitusi, "Perludem Perkuat Argumentasi Uji Pemilu Serentak Lima Kotak | Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia," Oktober 2024, <https://www.mkri.id/index.php?page=web.Berita&id=21722>.

⁶ S. Sulistyowati et al., "Refleksi Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Pada Pemilihan Presiden Tahun 2024 Terhadap Politik Dan Demokrasi Indonesia," *Qanuniya : Jurnal Ilmu Hukum* 1, no. 1 (2024): 1, <https://doi.org/10.15575/qanuniya.v1i1.826>.

⁷ Novendri M. Nggilu et al., "Abusive Constitutional Court:: Dysplasia and the Destructive Power of Constitutional Court Decisions," *Estudios Constitucionales: Revista Del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales*, *Estudios Constitucionales: Revista Del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales* 22, no. 2 (2024): 69–99, <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=9934554>.

⁸ *Menakar Pemisahan Pemilu Pasca Putusan MK No 135/PUU/XXII/2024*, directed by Rumah Pemilu, 2025, 39:31, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ucYMkAuttiA>.

Current academic discourse has predominantly focused on the "constitutional necessity" of simultaneity to prevent divided government or evaluated the administrative failures of the 2019 and 2024 cycles from a technical perspective. However, there is a significant scholarly gap in examining the immediate constitutional shifts following the landmark Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024. While previous studies focused on "why elections should be simultaneous" to strengthen presidentialism, this study establishes its state of the art by critically analyzing the paradigm shift back toward separation. It moves beyond mere administrative evaluation by offering a pioneering constitutional critique of how this new "hybrid-separation" model redefines the relationship between national and regional popular sovereignty.

The Court's decision brings significant advantages in reducing the workload of election organizers and enhancing voter focus at each level of government. This separation has the potential to improve the quality of political campaigns, simplify logistical processes, and provide a more effective platform for voter education. However, this solution also faces challenges, including the potential rise in election costs due to dual timelines, the risk of voter fatigue from more frequent elections, and the possible decline in voter turnout for regional elections. Additionally, concerns persist regarding inconsistencies in political momentum between the central and regional governments.⁹

This study presents a comprehensive analysis of the constitutional implications of separating national and regional elections, examining the substance of the Constitutional Court's ruling, evaluating its impact on Indonesia's constitutional structure, and projecting future implementation challenges. The analytical framework includes an in-depth examination of the Court's legal reasoning, assessments of implications for the presidential and regional governance systems, and identification of legislative frameworks required to operationalize this electoral separation. This approach aims to provide a constitutional roadmap for electoral system reform in Indonesia.

The objective of this study is to analyze the legal substance and reasoning behind Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024 concerning the separation of national and regional elections, to evaluate its constitutional implications for Indonesia's governmental system particularly the presidential and regional governance structures – and to assess how this decision interacts with the principles of democracy and popular sovereignty enshrined in the 1945 Constitution. Furthermore, it explores legislative challenges and the prospects for electoral system reform. Through these aims, the study seeks to contribute both theoretically and practically to the development of a more responsive, effective, and democratic electoral framework in Indonesia.

2. Research Methods

This study adopts a normative juridical approach, which focuses on the examination of applicable positive legal norms, legal doctrines, and judicial decisions¹⁰ to address the legal issues formulated in the research. This approach was chosen because the study centers on analyzing the constitutional dynamics of the electoral system, particularly in

⁹ Putusan Makkamah Konstitusi Nomor 135/PUU-XXII/2024 (2025).

¹⁰ Irwansyah Irwansyah, *Penelitian Hukum ; Pilihan Metode & Praktik Penulisan Artikel* (Mirra Buana Media, 2020).

relation to Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024, which signifies a substantial shift in Indonesia's electoral legal architecture. The research does not merely explore the textual aspects of legal norms but also considers the legal arguments presented in court decisions and their systemic implications for electoral legislation.

Primary legal sources in this study include the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia as the fundamental constitutional framework, as well as a number of Constitutional Court decisions—specifically Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024, which serves as the core focus, and two earlier rulings, Decision No. 14/PUU-XI/2013 and Decision No. 55/PUU-XVII/2019. These earlier decisions are employed for comparative purposes to trace the Court's consistency and evolving interpretations of electoral simultaneity principles. Secondary legal sources consist of academic literature, such as constitutional law books, relevant national and international scholarly journals on electoral and constitutional law, expert opinion articles, reports by election monitoring institutions, and recent news publications capturing public and academic reactions to the Constitutional Court's ruling.¹¹

Data collection was conducted through library research by identifying, inventorying, and evaluating relevant legal materials, including legislation, court decisions, and scholarly documents. The data analysis method applied is qualitative analysis, in which collected legal materials are processed and interpreted systematically to answer the research questions. The analysis employs legal interpretation methods—grammatical, systematic, and teleological—to discern the meaning and direction of the Constitutional Court's interpretations in the ruling under study. In addition, comparative analysis is utilized to examine differences and continuities among the decisions, thereby offering a comprehensive understanding of the Court's constitutional logic in designing national and regional electoral systems. Through this approach, the study aims to make both theoretical and practical contributions to the development of electoral law and constitutional law in Indonesia.¹²

3. Result and Discussion

3.1. Dynamics of Constitutional Court Rulings on Electoral Simultaneity

3.1.1. Analysis of Constitutional Court Decision No. 14/PUU-XI/2013: The Mandate for Simultaneity

Constitutional Court Decision No. 14/PUU-XI/2013, issued on January 23, 2013, marked the initial milestone in regulating simultaneous general elections in Indonesia. The ruling mandated the combination of presidential and legislative elections starting from

¹¹ Mahmud Marzuki, *Penelitian Hukum: Edisi Revisi* (Prenada Media, 2017).

¹² Mukti Fajar and Yulianto Achmad, *Dualisme Penelitian Hukum : Normatif & Empiris* (Pustaka Pelajar, 2010); H. Ishaq, *Metode Penelitian Hukum Dan Penulisan Skripsi, Tesis Serta Disertasi* (Alfabeta, 2017).

2019.¹³ It was issued in response to a judicial review of Law No. 42 of 2008 concerning the Presidential and Vice Presidential Election.¹⁴

In its legal reasoning, the Constitutional Court argued that electoral simultaneity aimed to establish stronger and more legitimate governance while enhancing the efficiency of the democratic process.¹⁵ The Court's reasoning included the relationship between the electoral system and the presidential system of government, an interpretation of the original intent of the 1945 Constitution indicating a preference for simultaneity, and considerations for administrative efficiency and the citizens' right to make informed voting choices.¹⁶ Despite these idealistic foundations, the actual implementation of the 2019 and 2024 elections using a five-ballot system revealed numerous practical issues. These included a high number of deaths and health complications among election officials and significant difficulties faced by voters in exercising their rights optimally.¹⁷ These realities highlighted a considerable gap between the normative ideals envisioned by the Constitutional Court and the actual implementation on the ground.

3.1.2. Analysis of Constitutional Court Decision No. 55/PUU-XVII/2019: Space for Open Legal Policy

Constitutional Court Decision No. 55/PUU-XVII/2019, delivered in 2019, provided broader discretion to the legislature. This ruling explicitly allowed the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Government to choose one of six constitutionally valid models of electoral simultaneity.¹⁸ The Court, at that time, did not impose a rigid model but instead handed the design of simultaneity over to the legislature as part of the open legal policy domain.

The decision reaffirmed that the design of electoral simultaneity lies within the legislature's discretion, granting the DPR and the Government the flexibility to select the most appropriate model based on political needs and dynamics. However, this ruling has triggered serious debates regarding the judicial consistency of the Constitutional Court. Figures such as Deputy Chair of Commission II of the DPR, Muhammad Rifqinizamy Karsayuda, and Member Muhammad Khosin criticized Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024 as being contradictory to Decision No. 55/PUU-XVII/2019. While the earlier decision granted broad discretion to lawmakers, the latter appeared to

¹³ Sri Asriana et al., "Pemisahan Penyelenggaraan Pemilu Serentak Tingkat Nasional Dan Daerah," *Risalah Hukum* 18, no. 1 (2022): 1, <https://doi.org/10.30872/risalah.v18i1.586>.

¹⁴ S. H. Ashari, "Implikasi Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 14/Puu-Xi/2013 Tentang Pemilihan Umum Secara Serentak," *Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum Dan Keadilan* 4, no. 1 (2016): 1, <https://doi.org/10.29303/ius.v4i1.275>.

¹⁵ Asriana et al., "Pemisahan Penyelenggaraan Pemilu Serentak Tingkat Nasional Dan Daerah."

¹⁶ Rubian Ariviani* et al., "Analisis Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 14/Puu-Xi/2013 Berkaitan Dengan Pemilihan Umum Serentak Di Indonesia," *Diponegoro Law Journal* 5, no. 4 (2016): 4, <https://doi.org/10.14710/dlj.2016.13455>.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Elisabeth Felita Silalahi and Andina Elok Puri Maharani, "Analisis Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 55/PUU-XVII/2019 Terkait Desain Pemilihan Umum Serentak Guna Mewujudkan Penyelenggaraan Pemilihan Umum Yang Demokratis," *Res Publica: Jurnal Hukum Kebijakan Publik* 5, no. 2 (2021): 2, <https://doi.org/10.20961/respublica.v5i2.58451>.

prescribe a specific model,¹⁹ raising concerns over legal certainty and the Constitutional Court’s institutional credibility in upholding constitutional interpretation stability.

Whereas Decision No. 14/PUU-XI/2013 emphasized constitutional idealism – such as strengthening the presidential system and ensuring electoral efficiency – Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024 was justified primarily by the practical failures and negative impacts of previous simultaneous elections, including administrative burden, fatigue, and declining quality. This reflects a shift in the Court’s reasoning from purely normative constitutional interpretation toward a more pragmatic consideration of empirical outcomes and implementation challenges.²⁰ This shift suggests an evolution in the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, where practical feasibility and human costs in electoral administration are granted greater weight. While this may be seen as a positive development enhancing judicial responsiveness, it also risks blurring the lines between judicial review and policy-making by effectively dictating electoral policy through constitutional interpretation.²¹

To clarify this evolution in jurisprudence, the following table presents a comparative summary of the three key Constitutional Court decisions:

**Table 1. Comparison of Electoral Simultaneity Designs
in Constitutional Court Decisions**

| Comparison Criteria | Decision No. 14/PUU-XI/2013 | Decision No. 55/PUU-XVII/2019 | Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024 |
|-------------------------------------|---|--|---|
| Year of Decision | 2013 | 2019 | 2024 |
| Subject Matter | Judicial Review of Law No. 42/2008 (Presidential Election) | Judicial Review of Law No. 7/2017 (General Elections) | Judicial Review of Law No. 7/2017 (General Elections) |
| Main Verdict on Simultaneity | Mandated simultaneous presidential and legislative elections starting in 2019 | Granted open legal policy for six simultaneity models | Ordered separation of national and regional elections starting in 2029 |
| Key Legal Reasoning | Strengthening the presidential system, efficiency, original intent of the 1945 Constitution, informed voting rights | Flexibility of lawmakers, no single constitutional model | Minimizing administrative burden, improving electoral quality, efficiency |

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Putusan Makkamah Konstitusi Nomor 135/PUU-XXII/2024.

²¹ *Pakar: Putusan MK Soal Pemisahan Pemilu Tidak Bertentangan dengan UUD*, with Devi Harahap (Metro TV, 2025), <https://www.metrotvnews.com/read/koGCdqYa-pakar-putusan-mk-soal-pemisahan-pemilu-tidak-bertentangan-dengan-uud>.

| | | | | |
|--------------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| Electoral Outcome | Design | Five-ballot simultaneous elections | Legislative freedom to choose a model | Separate national and regional elections (2-2.5 year gap) |
|--------------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|

Source: Compiled by the authors from Constitutional Court decisions.

3.2. Substance and Legal Considerations of Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024

3.2.1. Background of the Petition and Core Legal Issues

Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024 emerged as a constitutional response to the ongoing controversies surrounding the simultaneous election model within Indonesia’s electoral governance. The petition, filed by the Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem), was more than a mere legal challenge it embodied a consistent advocacy trajectory that Perludem had pursued since 2015.²² As a civil society actor, Perludem viewed the five-ballot system used in the 2019 and 2024 elections not merely as a technical complication, but as a structural impediment to democratic consolidation. In their petition, Perludem asserted that the simultaneity model weakened healthy party institutionalization, complicated party system simplification, and distorted the articulation and aggregation of the people’s will as an expression of popular sovereignty.²³

The petition also explicitly raised institutional and technical challenges caused by the disproportionate workload imposed on election organizers. Overlapping electoral stages and overly compressed timelines placed election administration quality and managerial integrity under serious threat.²⁴ Perludem argued that the excessive burden not only undermined administrative performance but also eroded public trust in democratic institutions. In this context, the petition to the Constitutional Court sought to trigger a redesign of Indonesia’s electoral architecture that would be more proportional, measurable, and oriented toward enhancing substantive democratic quality. The Court’s ruling in this case represents a crucial marker affirming that evaluation of electoral simultaneity is not merely a technical matter but one closely tied to safeguarding democratic quality and protecting citizens’ constitutional rights.²⁵

3.2.2. Verdict and Its Implications for Electoral Design

²² Sri Pujianti, “Perludem: Pemilu Serentak Lima Kotak Melemahkan Pelembagaan Partai Politik | Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia,” Oktober 2024, <https://www.mkri.id/index.php?page=web.Berita&id=21662>.

²³ Naomi Lyandra, “Menakar Dampak Putusan MK Pisahkan Pemilu Nasional-Daerah,” with Resky Novianto, July 7, 2025, <https://kbr.id/berita/nasional/menakar-dampak-putusan-mk-pisahkan-pemilu-nasional-daerah>.

²⁴ Komisi Pemilihan Umum, “Dibalik Partisipasi Pemilih Pemilu 2019,” September 20, 2019, <https://www.kpu.go.id/berita/baca/7729/Persentase-jumlah-pemilih-yang-menggunakan-hak-pilihnya-dari-total-pemilih-terdaftar-pada-Pemilu-2019-sangatlah-tinggi-Secara-nasional--angka-partisipasi-pemilih-Pemilu-2019-itu-ialah-81-persen>.

²⁵ Komisi Pemilihan Umum, “Putusan MK Perkuat Kualitas Pemilu,” June 28, 2025, <https://www.kpu.go.id/berita/baca/12981/putusan-mk-perkuat-kualitas-pemilu>.

Through Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024, the Court marked a significant turning point in Indonesia's constitutional and electoral history by formally reformulating the electoral simultaneity model, which had long presented institutional, technical, and democratic challenges. In its ruling, the Court declared that voting for members of the DPR (House of Representatives), DPD (Regional Representative Council), and the President and Vice President shall continue to be conducted simultaneously in a single electoral event. However, in a groundbreaking move, the Court ordered the separation of this stage from the election of regional heads (governors, regents/mayors) and DPRD members at the provincial and regency/municipal levels, to be held no earlier than two years and no later than two years and six months following the inauguration of the President and Vice President.²⁶

This separation is not merely a technical adjustment; it represents a fundamental shift in how the nation organizes its electoral democracy, allowing for a more staged and structured political consolidation at each level of government. Normatively, the ruling applies prospectively and is binding for elections beginning in 2029. Accordingly, its direct implication lies at the heart of electoral regulations, particularly Law No. 7 of 2017 on General Elections and Law No. 10 of 2016 on Regional Elections, both of which must be revised to align with the new legal construction established by the Court.

This change reflects a concrete shift from a fully simultaneous electoral model to one governed by temporal decentralization. The separation of national and regional elections is expected not only to alleviate the technical burden of electoral administration but also to provide broader space for local democratic maturation, foster the gradual strengthening of political parties, and enhance public participation without being overshadowed by the noise of national simultaneous elections.²⁷ Thus, this ruling is not merely a corrective measure to an existing system but also a visionary step toward building a more just, rational, and humane architecture for electoral democracy.

3.2.3. Analysis of the Constitutional Court's Legal Reasoning

The Constitutional Court's primary consideration in issuing this decision was the severe congestion of electoral stages experienced by election organizers, which had a rational and direct impact on the overall quality of election implementation.²⁸ The Court observed that the excessive concentration of workloads within a narrow timeframe left a relatively long post-election idle period for election administrators. As a result, the five-year tenure of national election organizers became inefficient and ineffective, since their "core tasks" were effectively limited to around two years of intensive activity.²⁹ The constitutionalization of electoral efficiency and quality thus formed the cornerstone of the Court's reasoning.

Essentially, the Constitutional Court declared that any electoral design that leads to systemic fatigue and compromises quality – whether through administrative errors or lack of focus – is unconstitutional, as it violates the very essence of elections that are

²⁶ Putusan Makkamah Konstitusi Nomor 135/PUU-XXII/2024.

²⁷ *MK Hapus Pemilu Serentak, Siapa Diuntungkan?*, directed by Harian Kompas (Harian Kompas, 2025), 06:49, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19AiqRoQSwQ>.

²⁸ Komisi Pemilihan Umum, "Putusan MK Perkuat Kualitas Pemilu."

²⁹ Lyandra, "Menakar Dampak Putusan MK Pisahkan Pemilu Nasional-Daerah."

direct, general, free, confidential, honest, and fair (commonly known in Indonesia as LUBER JURDIL). The Court's emphasis on "ensuring better electoral quality"³⁰ and "declining quality of popular sovereignty"³¹ elevated administrative and human factors to the level of constitutional concern.³² This sets a precedent in which the practical feasibility and human impact of electoral administration can be regarded as legitimate constitutional considerations, potentially broadening the scope of judicial review. It illustrates the Court's willingness to intervene not only in cases of textual constitutional violations but also based on the practical consequences of a law on the functioning and integrity of the democratic process.

Moreover, the Court noted that voter focus was severely fragmented by the excessive number of candidates and limited voting time within the five-ballot system, ultimately undermining the quality of democratic expression.³³ The separation of elections is therefore expected to minimize administrative burden, reduce staff fatigue, and ensure a higher standard of electoral organization.³⁴

Although Article 22E of the 1945 Constitution does not explicitly mandate electoral simultaneity and only outlines the principles of LUBER JURDIL,³⁵ the Court found that this separation falls within the permissible constitutional space. The Court left the mechanisms and causal arrangements of candidacy at national and regional levels to be determined by the legislature, within the framework of a democratic rule-of-law state.³⁶

However, this decision has sparked a constitutional dilemma between legislative flexibility and judicial certainty. Criticisms have arisen from the DPR, which argues that the Court effectively imposed a specific model instead of leaving the matter to open legal

³⁰ Setjen DPR RI, *Komisi II Pertanyaan Konsistensi MK dalam Putusan Pemisahan Pemilu, PARLEMENTARIA*, January 7, 2025, <https://jdih.dpr.go.id/berita/detail/id/57206/t/Komisi+II+Pertanyaan+Konsistensi+MK+dalam+Putusan+Pemisahan+Pemilu>.

³¹ *Pengamat Soal Putusan MK 135: Hukum Pemilu Terus Berkembang*, directed by CNN Indonesia (CNN Indonesia, 2025), 03:42, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MHtHVSfymX8>.

³² Ahmad Ahmad, "Analysis of Abuse of Authority by Government Apparatus in the State Administrative Legal System," *International Journal of Constitutional and Administrative Law* 1, no. 1 (2025): 1, <https://ijcal.profesionallegal.com/index.php/ijcal/article/view/4>.

³³ *Pengamat Soal Putusan MK 135*.

³⁴ *Menakar Pemisahan Pemilu Pasca Putusan MK No 135/PUU/XXII/2024*.

³⁵ Muhammad Aris Mufti et al., "Model Pengaturan Presidential Threshold Dalam Pemilihan Umum Serentak Ditinjau Dari Perspektif Demokrasi," *Jurnal Diskresi* 2, no. 2 (2023), <https://journal.unram.ac.id/index.php/diskresi/article/view/3672>.

³⁶ Ahmad et al., *Hukum Konstitusi (Menyongsong Fajar Perubahan Konstitusi Indonesia Melalui Pelibatan Mahkamah Konstitusi)* (UII Press, 2020); Ahmad Ahmad and Novendri M. Nggilu, "Denyut Nadi Amandemen Kelima UUD 1945 Melalui Pelibatan Mahkamah Konstitusi Sebagai Prinsip the Guardian of the Constitution," *Jurnal Konstitusi* 16, no. 4 (2019): 4, <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk1646>; Ahmad Ahmad and Novendri M. Nggilu, *Constitutional Dialogue: Menguatkan Intraksi Menekan Dominasi (Konvergensi Terhadap Pengujian Norma Di Mahkamah Konstitusi)* (UII Press, 2023); Ahmad et al., "Constitutional Dialogue in Judicial Review at the Indonesian Constitutional Court: The Future Prospects," *Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues* 25, no. 1S (2021), <https://www.abacademies.org/abstract/constitutional-dialogue-in-judicial-review-at-the-indonesian-constitutional-court-the-future-prospects-13248.html>; Nggilu et al., "Abusive Constitutional Court."

policy, thereby acting as a norm-maker. This situation highlights a tension between the Court's earlier stance granting open legal policy in Decision No. 55/PUU-XVII/2019 and its current prescriptive ruling in Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024, where it seemingly established a new model unilaterally.³⁷

This creates a dilemma: on one hand, the Court aims to correct systemic failures and address real challenges; on the other, it is seen as overstepping legislative authority, potentially undermining legal certainty for future electoral reform. Such developments call for a critical reassessment of the boundaries of judicial review, especially when the Court transitions from interpreting existing norms to effectively "creating" new electoral models through its constitutional interpretation.

3.3. Constitutional Implications of Separating National and Regional Elections

3.3.1. Impact on the Presidential System and Regional Governance

The separation of national elections (for President, DPR, and DPD) from regional elections (for governors, regents/mayors, and DPRD at the provincial and local levels) is expected to reinforce the presidential system at the national level.³⁸ With a more distinct electoral focus, the outcomes of national elections can more accurately reflect the legitimacy of the President and Vice President, minimizing the "coattail effect" resulting from legislative or local elections.³⁹ Conversely, regional elections conducted separately would enhance the clarity and strength of the mandates given to local leaders and DPRD members, potentially increasing accountability of local governments to their own constituents without being overly influenced by national political dynamics.

Beyond addressing efficiency issues, the separation implicitly redefines the electoral relationship between the central and regional governments. The ruling signals a shift toward more distinct electoral mandates for each level of governance rather than interlinked ones. This may lead to clearer political accountability, enabling voters to differentiate national and local issues and performance, thereby fostering stronger regional leadership. Such a shift could reduce "coat-tailing",⁴⁰ where local elections are heavily influenced by national politics, resulting in a more autonomous local political landscape.

However, it may also pose new challenges for policy harmonization and coordination between national and regional governments if electoral cycles and political mandates diverge too widely, potentially affecting the effectiveness of integrated governance

³⁷ Sarmila Radjak and Ahmad Ahmad, "Menguji Batas Kewenangan: Tafsir Mahkamah Konstitusi Atas UUD 1945 Dalam Dinamika Demokrasi Modern," *Al-Zayn: Jurnal Ilmu Sosial & Hukum* 3, no. 3 (2025): 3, <https://doi.org/10.61104/alz.v3i3.1436>.

³⁸ Komisi Pemilihan Umum, "Putusan MK Perkuat Kualitas Pemilu."

³⁹ Tonny Dian Effendi, "Estimating the Multilevel Coattail Effect during the 2019 Indonesian Election," *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Routledge, July 3, 2022, world, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00927678.2022.2091909>; Djayadi Hanan and Deni Irvani, *The Coattail Effect in Multiparty Presidential Elections Evidence from Indonesia*, n.d., accessed July 12, 2025, <https://online.ucpress.edu/as/article/62/2/240/120309/The-Coattail-Effect-in-Multiparty-Presidential>.

⁴⁰ Marc Meredith, "Exploiting Friends-and-Neighbors to Estimate Coattail Effects," *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 4 (2013): 742-65, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000439>.

programs. This separation also encourages the development of structured and effective political recruitment mechanisms at the regional and national levels, enabling political parties to cultivate leadership systematically from the local to the national level.⁴¹

3.3.2. Relevance to the Principles of Democracy and Popular Sovereignty in the 1945 Constitution

Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024 rests on a strong normative foundation: the fundamental principles of democratic elections enshrined in Article 22E of the 1945 Constitution namely, that elections must be direct, general, free, confidential, honest, and fair (LUBER JURDIL).⁴² Within this framework, the separation of national and regional elections is not considered a constitutional deviation, but rather a means to more substantively fulfill those democratic principles.

The Court emphasized that as long as elections are conducted honestly and fairly, and guarantee both the freedom to vote and the protection of individual political privacy, then variations in electoral design—including the timing of elections remain constitutionally valid. In this sense, the decision introduces a reinterpretation of constitutional flexibility, reflecting the ability of the Constitution to adapt to the dynamic demands of electoral democracy without abandoning its fundamental democratic norms.

Furthermore, the separation of elections offers the promise of a more mature and better-managed democratic process. Previously, the five-ballot simultaneous elections produced what has been referred to as “political fatigue” among voters, who were forced to make too many decisions in a limited timeframe.⁴³ This situation imposed not only cognitive and psychological burdens on voters but also diminished the rational quality of their political choices.

With electoral stages separated in time, each phase can become a more focused deliberative space for voters, political parties, and election organizers alike. Voters will have sufficient time to understand the vision, mission, and track record of candidates more thoroughly, enabling more rational, informed, and democratic decision-making. Ultimately, this electoral design is expected to restore the substantive meaning of popular sovereignty not as a mere formal electoral procedure, but as an effective mechanism for realizing the collective will of citizens in forming legitimate and trustworthy governance.

⁴¹ Rifqi Ridlo Phahlevy, “Tanggapi Pemisahan Pemilu, Pakar Umsida: Yang Penting Tetap LUBER JURDIL,” July 10, 2025, <https://umsida.ac.id/pakar-umsida-tanggapi-pemisahan-pemilu/>.

⁴² Markus Fallo et al., “Efektivitas Penerapan Asas Langsung, Umum, Bebas, Rahasia, Jujur, Dan Adil Dalam Penyelenggaraan Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Dprd) Kota Kupang Tahun 2024,” *Petitum Law Journal* 2, no. 2 (2025): 2, <https://doi.org/10.35508/pelana.v2i2.18859>.

⁴³ Agung Siswanto and Zainul Ahwan, “Politik Hiburan Dalam Pemilu: Perolehan Suara Komeng Pada Pemilu 2024,” *Al-Tsiqoh: Jurnal Ekonomi Dan Dakwah Islam* 9, no. 1 (2024): 1, <https://doi.org/10.31538/altsiq.v9i1.5434>.

3.3.3. Consequences for Electoral Efficiency and Democratic Quality

One of the most prominent and strategic consequences of Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024 is the substantial opportunity it presents to reduce the excessive workload historically borne by election organizers – particularly the General Elections Commission (KPU), the Elections Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu), and polling station officers (KPPS). Empirical experience from the 2019 and 2024 simultaneous elections demonstrated the extreme technical complexity and workload that resulted from conducting five separate elections in a single day. This situation led to extremely strenuous working conditions and even triggered widespread fatigue and fatalities among KPPS officers.⁴⁴

By separating the schedule of national and regional elections, the overall burden can be distributed more proportionally over an extended period. This is expected to significantly mitigate fatigue, improve accuracy, and enhance the focus and performance of electoral organizers, which in turn will contribute to increased professionalism and integrity in electoral administration.

Beyond technical concerns, this separation also opens the door for optimizing the five-year tenure of national-level electoral organizers, which had previously been dominated by a two-year high-pressure cycle. With a temporally distributed election design, election administrators will have more time and opportunity to plan, prepare, and evaluate each stage more systematically and over a longer term. This will positively affect institutional efficiency and administrative effectiveness.

Additionally, budgetary efficiency is a rational consideration that must not be overlooked. With a more proportionately distributed workload, the use of state resources including budgets, logistics, and human capital can be managed more prudently and sustainably.⁴⁵ Thus, the separated election model is not merely a matter of scheduling; it represents a structural reform strategy aimed at improving democratic quality, ensuring accountable fiscal management, and reinforcing resilient and adaptive electoral institutions.

3.3.4. Public and Academic Discourse on the Constitutional Court's Decision

Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024 has sparked diverse responses and debates among both the public and academic communities. KPU Chairman Mochammad Afifuddin stated that the ruling would help minimize the workload of election administrators and improve the quality of elections.⁴⁶ He also noted that it would necessitate amendments to both the General Elections Law and the Regional Elections Law. Similarly, Perludem welcomed the ruling as a necessary correction to the weaknesses of the five-ballot simultaneous election system and a step forward in electoral reform.

Nevertheless, concerns and criticisms have emerged from the House of Representatives (DPR). Deputy Chairman of Commission II, Muhammad Rifqinizamy Karsayuda,

⁴⁴ Phahlevy, "Tanggapi Pemisahan Pemilu, Pakar Umsida."

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Komisi Pemilihan Umum, "Putusan MK Perkuat Kualitas Pemilu."

argued that the decision contradicts the earlier Constitutional Court Decision No. 55/PUU-XVII/2019, which had granted lawmakers the discretion of open legal policy.⁴⁷ Commission II member Muhammad Khosin also questioned the Constitutional Court's institutional consistency, stating that if this ruling is to be implemented consistently, it may require a limited amendment to the 1945 Constitution specifically to Articles 22E (paragraphs 1 and 2) and Article 18 (paragraph 3).⁴⁸

The proposition that a constitutional amendment may be necessary as a consequence of this ruling underscores its far-reaching implications. A judicial decision that directly prompts calls for constitutional revision indicates a deep impact on the fundamental legal structure. The fact that legislative actors are raising this issue reflects a perceived structural misalignment between the Court's decision and the existing constitutional text. It highlights the extent of structural transformation implied by the ruling. If the current constitutional provisions are deemed insufficient or incompatible with the newly mandated electoral design, it could trigger a politically sensitive and complex constitutional amendment process.

The debate also extends to the realm of constitutional interpretation. Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Bima Arya Sugiarto, touched on the question of whether regional elections (Pilkada) and general elections belong to the same legal regime or should be treated separately arguing that this depends on one's perspective in interpreting the 1945 Constitution.⁴⁹ Legal scholars also expressed differing opinions. Electoral law expert from the University of Indonesia, Titi Anggraini, maintained that the ruling does not violate the Constitution, although other commentators criticized the Court for stepping into the legislative domain.⁵⁰ Additional observers noted that Decision 135 raises questions about the regularity of five-year electoral cycles and the overall design of simultaneous national and regional elections.⁵¹

The following table summarizes the potential implications of Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/2024 across several aspects of electoral administration and institutions:

⁴⁷ Phahlevy, "Tanggapi Pemisahan Pemilu, Pakar Umsida."

⁴⁸ Setjen DPR RI, "MK Harusnya Konsisten dengan Putusan Sebelumnya, Jangan Langkahi Kewenangan DPR," June 27, 2025, <https://jdih.dpr.go.id/berita/detail/id/57154/t/Khozin%3A+MK+Harusnya+Konsisten+dengan+Putusan+Sebelumnya%2C+Jangan+Langkahi+Kewenangan+DPR>.

⁴⁹ Kompas Cyber Media, "Soal Pemilu Dipisah, Wamendagri: Sejauh Mana Kewenangan MK dalam Pembentukan Undang-Undang?," KOMPAS.com, July 3, 2025, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/07/03/20565061/soal-pemilu-dipisah-wamendagri-sejauh-mana-kewenangan-mk-dalam-pembentukan>.

⁵⁰ *Pakar*.

⁵¹ *Pengamat Soal Putusan MK 135*.

Table 2. Potential Implications of Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/2024 on Electoral Administration and Institutions

| Aspect | Expected Positive Implications | Negative Implications / Emerging Challenges |
|---|---|---|
| Election Organizers | Reduced workload, less staff fatigue, more efficient tenure utilization | Need for revised recruitment processes and ad hoc structural adjustments |
| Election & Democracy Quality | Improved implementation quality, increased voter focus, enhanced realization of popular sovereignty | Potential debates on constitutional interpretation |
| System of Government | Strengthened presidential system, empowered regional governance, structured political recruitment | Possible inter-institutional conflicts (legislative-judicial tensions) |
| Legislation | Momentum to unify the General Elections Law and Regional Elections Law; urgency for legal revision | Issues of inconsistency among Constitutional Court rulings; potential for constitutional amendments |
| Budgetary Aspects | Opportunity for fiscal efficiency | Requires comprehensive assessment to determine real cost-effectiveness |

Source: Compiled by the authors from multiple legal and academic sources

3.4. Legislative Challenges and Prospects for Electoral System Reform After Constitutional Court Decision 135/2024

3.4.1. The Urgency of Amending the Electoral Laws

Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024 explicitly states that the ruling will have direct implications for revisions to the General Elections Law and the Regional Elections Law.⁵² This creates an urgent legislative necessity to align the legal framework with the new electoral model set forth by the Court. KPU Chairman Mochammad Afifuddin considers this ruling a strategic momentum for lawmakers to merge the two laws into a unified legal framework.⁵³ Such consolidation would simplify and harmonize various electoral regulations currently scattered across separate instruments, fostering greater legal coherence and operational efficiency.

The government has shown commitment to implementing the Court's decision by forming an inter-ministerial review team tasked with drafting the revisions,

⁵² Cipto Prayitno, "Analisis Konstitusionalitas Batasan Kewenangan Presiden Dalam Penetapan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang," *Jurnal Konstitusi* 17, no. 3 (2020): 3, <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk1733>.

⁵³ Komisi Pemilihan Umum, "Putusan MK Perkuat Kualitas Pemilu."

including soliciting public input and consultation from various stakeholders.⁵⁴ Moreover, the legislative revision must address the implications of this new simultaneity model on the recruitment patterns of election officials from the provincial and municipal levels to the formation of ad hoc committees at the polling station level to ensure a more ideal and efficient structure.

This ruling, therefore, is not merely about separating elections in time, but could serve as a catalyst for broader and more comprehensive reforms of Indonesia's electoral laws. It has the potential to transcend mere scheduling adjustments and instead streamline the entire legal framework, resolving longstanding issues such as regulatory fragmentation, duplication, and the absence of a coherent systemic vision in current election laws. This is a rare opportunity to address deep-rooted structural deficiencies in Indonesia's electoral legal system.⁵⁵

3.4.2. Consistency of Constitutional Court Rulings and Legal Certainty

One of the principal challenges in implementing this decision lies in the strong criticism expressed by members of the House of Representatives (DPR), such as Muhammad Rifqinizamy Karsayuda and Muhammad Khosin, who view Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024 as inconsistent with the earlier Decision No. 55/PUU-XVII/2019.⁵⁶ This criticism highlights concerns about institutional inconsistency within the Constitutional Court and the potential negative effects on legal certainty within the constitutional system.

The central debate revolves around whether the Court has exceeded its authority as a judicial reviewer of the constitutionality of norms and instead encroached into the legislative or technical realm of implementation. This triggers a broader discussion about the limits of judicial power within a presidential system.

The explicit criticism from DPR members alleging that the Court has overstepped its legislative bounds and contradicted previous rulings suggests the potential for inter-branch conflict. While the government's response to form a review team is constructive, it also acknowledges the complexity that arises from such a strong judicial mandate.

This tension between judicial interpretation and the legislature's prerogative underscores a fundamental challenge in maintaining the separation of powers. The situation calls for robust constitutional dialogue and coordinated engagement among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches to ensure a smooth transition and avoid further legal and political instability.

⁵⁴ Lyandra, "Menakar Dampak Putusan MK Pisahkan Pemilu Nasional-Daerah."

⁵⁵ Setjen DPR RI, "Komisi II: Putusan MK Momentum Dorong Percepatan Revisi UU Pemilu," June 30, 2025, <https://jdih.dpr.go.id/berita/detail/id/57171/t/Komisi+II%3A+Putusan+MK+Momentum+Dorong+Percepatan+Revisi+UU+Pemilu>.

⁵⁶ RI, *Komisi II Pertanyakan Konsistensi MK dalam Putusan Pemisahan Pemilu*.

It also indicates that the implementation of this decision will not be a purely technical matter it will be deeply political and potentially controversial, requiring careful navigation of inter-branch relations and sensitivities.

3.4.3. Policy Recommendations for Future Electoral Governance

To reform Indonesia's electoral system in the aftermath of Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024, several policy recommendations can be proposed. *First*, it is essential to establish an electoral law that is stable and sustainable one that is not subject to frequent changes before each election. A consistent legal framework will provide greater legal certainty and institutional stability for both election organizers and participants. *Second*, the process of revising the electoral laws must involve inclusive and meaningful public participation. Civil society organizations such as Perludem, academic experts, and other key stakeholders should be actively involved to ensure that the resulting legislation is responsive to the democratic needs and aspirations of the people. *Third*, the new electoral system design must carefully consider how mechanisms and nomination schemes at both the regional and national levels can be optimised as effective political recruitment pathways for political parties. A structured and strategic candidate pipeline will support stronger and more accountable political institutions. *Lastly*, comprehensive adjustments must be made to the structure and operational framework of the General Elections Commission (KPU) and its ad hoc units. These institutional adaptations are necessary to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of election administration under the new, temporally separated model.

4. Conclusion

Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024 represents a pivotal milestone in the reform of Indonesia's electoral system, fundamentally altering the simultaneity design by separating national and regional elections beginning in 2029. The ruling is grounded in considerations of reducing the excessive workload on election organizers, mitigating fatigue among election officers, and enhancing the quality of both electoral administration and the exercise of popular sovereignty previously compromised under the "five-ballot" system. It reflects a notable shift in the Constitutional Court's orientation from purely normative idealism to practical implementation realities—acknowledging that efficiency and quality in electoral management are integral components of constitutional legitimacy.

However, this decision has also sparked significant debate over the judicial consistency of the Constitutional Court, especially when contrasted with Decision No. 55/PUU-XVII/2019, which had granted legislative discretion through the principle of open legal policy. It raises important questions regarding the limits of the Court's authority and the potential need for constitutional amendments.

The constitutional implications of separating elections extend beyond administrative reform. They encompass the potential strengthening of both the presidential system and regional governance through clearer electoral mandates, improved efficiency in election administration, and the enhancement of democratic quality. Nonetheless, these benefits require substantial legislative adjustments and a coordinated reform process involving all branches of government.

Ultimately, the decision serves not only as a corrective response to technical and institutional electoral shortcomings but also as a visionary step toward building a more adaptive, rational, and citizen-centered electoral system in Indonesia one that is both constitutionally grounded and democratically responsive.

Reference

- Ahmad, Ahmad. "Analysis of Abuse of Authority by Government Apparatus in the State Administrative Legal System." *International Journal of Constitutional and Administrative Law* 1, no. 1 (2025): 1. <https://ijcal.profesionallegal.com/index.php/ijcal/article/view/4>.
- Ahmad, Ahmad, and Novendri M. Nggilu. *Constitutional Dialogue : Menguatkan Intraksi Menekan Dominasi (Konvergensi Terhadap Pengujian Norma Di Mahkamah Konstitusi)*. UII Press, 2023.
- Ahmad, Ahmad, and Novendri M. Nggilu. "Denyut Nadi Amandemen Kelima UUD 1945 Melalui Pelibatan Mahkamah Konstitusi Sebagai Prinsip the Guardian of the Constitution." *Jurnal Konstitusi* 16, no. 4 (2019): 4. <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk1646>.
- Ahmad, Fence M. Wantu, and Dian Ekawaty Ismail. "Constitutional Dialogue in Judicial Review at the Indonesian Constitutional Court: The Future Prospects." *Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues* 25, no. 1S (2021). <https://www.abacademies.org/abstract/constitutional-dialogue-in-judicial-review-at-the-indonesian-constitutional-court-the-future-prospects-13248.html>.
- Ahmad, Fence M. Wantu, and Novendri M. Nggilu. *Hukum Konstitusi (Menyongsong Fajar Perubahan Konstitusi Indonesia Melalui Pelibatan Mahkamah Konstitusi)*. UII Press, 2020.
- Ariviani*, Rubian, Hasyim Asy'ari, and Untung Sri Hardjanto. "Analisis Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 14/Puu-Xi/2013 Berkaitan Dengan Pemilihan Umum Serentak Di Indonesia." *Diponegoro Law Journal* 5, no. 4 (2016): 4. <https://doi.org/10.14710/dlj.2016.13455>.
- Ashari, S. H. "Implikasi Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 14/Puu-Xi/2013 Tentang Pemilihan Umum Secara Serentak." *Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum Dan Keadilan* 4, no. 1 (2016): 1. <https://doi.org/10.29303/ius.v4i1.275>.
- Asriana, Sri, Rosmini, and Ine Ventyrina. "Pemisahan Penyelenggaraan Pemilu Serentak Tingkat Nasional Dan Daerah." *Risalah Hukum* 18, no. 1 (2022): 1. <https://doi.org/10.30872/risalah.v18i1.586>.
- CNN Indonesia, dir. *Pengamat Soal Putusan MK 135: Hukum Pemilu Terus Berkembang*. CNN Indonesia, 2025. 03:42. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MHtHVSfymX8>.
- Effendi, Tonny Dian. "Estimating the Multilevel Coattail Effect during the 2019 Indonesian Election." *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Routledge, July 3, 2022. world. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00927678.2022.2091909>.
- Fajar, Mukti, and Yulianto Achmad. *Dualisme Penelitian Hukum : Normatif & Empiris*. Pustaka Pelajar, 2010.
- Fallo, Markus, Hernimus Ratu Udju, and Cyrilius Wilton Taran Lamataro. "Efektivitas Penerapan Asas Langsung, Umum, Bebas, Rahasia, Jujur, Dan Adil Dalam Penyelenggaraan Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Dprd) Kota Kupang Tahun 2024." *Petition Law Journal* 2, no. 2 (2025): 2. <https://doi.org/10.35508/pelana.v2i2.18859>.

- Hanan, Djayadi, and Deni Irvani. *The Coattail Effect in Multiparty Presidential Elections Evidence from Indonesia*. n.d. Accessed July 12, 2025. <https://online.ucpress.edu/as/article/62/2/240/120309/The-Coattail-Effect-in-Multiparty-Presidential>.
- Harian Kompas, dir. *MK Hapus Pemilu Serentak, Siapa Diuntungkan?* Harian Kompas, 2025. 06:49. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19AiqRoQSwQ>.
- Irwansyah, Irwansyah. *Penelitian Hukum; Pilihan Metode & Praktik Penulisan Artikel*. Mirra Buana Media, 2020.
- Ishaq, H. *Metode Penelitian Hukum Dan Penulisan Skripsi, Tesis Serta Disertasi*. Alfabeta, 2017.
- Komisi Pemilihan Umum. "Dibalik Partisipasi Pemilih Pemilu 2019." September 20, 2019. <https://www.kpu.go.id/berita/baca/7729/Persentase-jumlah-pemilih-yang-menggunakan-hak-pilihnya-dari-total-pemilih-terdaftar-pada-Pemilu-2019-sangatlah-tinggi-Secara-nasional--angka-partisipasi-pemilih-Pemilu-2019-itu-ialah-81-persen>.
- Komisi Pemilihan Umum. "Putusan MK Perkuat Kualitas Pemilu." June 28, 2025. <https://www.kpu.go.id/berita/baca/12981/putusan-mk-perkuat-kualitas-pemilu>.
- Lyandra, Naomi. "Menakar Dampak Putusan MK Pisahkan Pemilu Nasional-Daerah." With Resky Novianto. July 7, 2025. <https://kbr.id/berita/nasional/menakar-dampak-putusan-mk-pisahkan-pemilu-nasional-daerah>.
- Mahkamah Konstitusi. "Perludem Perkuat Argumentasi Uji Pemilu Serentak Lima Kotak | Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia." Oktober 2024. <https://www.mkri.id/index.php?page=web.Berita&id=21722>.
- Marzuki, Mahmud. *Penelitian Hukum: Edisi Revisi*. Prenada Media, 2017.
- Media, Kompas Cyber. "Soal Pemilu Dipisah, Wamendagri: Sejauh Mana Kewenangan MK dalam Pembentukan Undang-Undang?" KOMPAS.com, July 3, 2025. <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/07/03/20565061/soal-pemilu-dipisah-wamendagri-sejauh-mana-kewenangan-mk-dalam-pembentukan>.
- Meredith, Marc. "Exploiting Friends-and-Neighbors to Estimate Coattail Effects." *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 4 (2013): 742-65. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000439>.
- Mufti, Muhammad Aris, Chrisdianto Eko Purnomo, and M. Saleh. "Model Pengaturan Presidential Threshold Dalam Pemilihan Umum Serentak Ditinjau Dari Perspektif Demokrasi." *Jurnal Diskresi* 2, no. 2 (2023). <https://journal.unram.ac.id/index.php/diskresi/article/view/3672>.
- Nggilu, Novendri M., Ahmad Ahmad, Moh Rivaldi MohA, Apripari Apripari, and Moh Hidayat MuhtAr. "Abusive Constitutional Court:: Dysplasia and the Destructive Power of Constitutional Court Decisions." *Estudios Constitucionales: Revista Del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales*. *Estudios Constitucionales: Revista Del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales* 22, no. 2 (2024): 69-99. <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=9934554>.
- Nurhasim, Moch. "Paradoks Pemilu Serentak 2019: Memperkokoh Multipartai Ekstrem Di Indonesia." *Journal of Political Research* 16, no. 2 (2019): 2. <https://doi.org/10.14203/jpp.v16i2.819>.
- Pakar: *Putusan MK Soal Pemisahan Pemilu Tidak Bertentangan dengan UUD*. With Devi Harahap. Metro TV, 2025. <https://www.metrotvnews.com/read/koGCdqYa-pakar-putusan-mk-soal-pemisahan-pemilu-tidak-bertentangan-dengan-uud>.

- Phahlevy, Rifqi Ridlo. "Tanggapi Pemisahan Pemilu, Pakar Umsida: Yang Penting Tetap LUBER JURDIL." July 10, 2025. <https://umsida.ac.id/pakar-umsida-tanggapi-pemisahan-pemilu/>.
- Prayitno, Cipto. "Analisis Konstitusionalitas Batasan Kewenangan Presiden Dalam Penetapan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang." *Jurnal Konstitusi* 17, no. 3 (2020): 3. <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk1733>.
- Pujianti, Sri. "Perludem: Pemilu Serentak Lima Kotak Melemahkan Pelembagaan Partai Politik | Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia." Oktober 2024. <https://www.mkri.id/index.php?page=web.Berita&id=21662>.
- Putusan Makkamah Konstitusi Nomor 135/PUU-XXII/2024 (2025).
- Radjak, Sarmila, and Ahmad Ahmad. "Menguji Batas Kewenangan: Tafsir Mahkamah Konstitusi Atas UUD 1945 Dalam Dinamika Demokrasi Modern." *Al-Zayn : Jurnal Ilmu Sosial & Hukum* 3, no. 3 (2025): 3. <https://doi.org/10.61104/alz.v3i3.1436>.
- RI, Setjen DPR. *Komisi II Pertanyakan Konsistensi MK dalam Putusan Pemisahan Pemilu. PARLEMENTARIA.* January 7, 2025. <https://jdih.dpr.go.id/berita/detail/id/57206/t/Komisi+II+Pertanyakan+Konsistensi+MK+dalam+Putusan+Pemisahan+Pemilu>.
- RI, Setjen DPR. "Komisi II: Putusan MK Momentum Dorong Percepatan Revisi UU Pemilu." June 30, 2025. <https://jdih.dpr.go.id/berita/detail/id/57171/t/Komisi+II%3A+Putusan+MK+Momentum+Dorong+Percepatan+Revisi+UU+Pemilu>.
- RI, Setjen DPR. "MK Harusnya Konsisten dengan Putusan Sebelumnya, Jangan Langkahi Kewenangan DPR." June 27, 2025. <https://jdih.dpr.go.id/berita/detail/id/57154/t/Khozin%3A+MK+Harusnya+Konsisten+dengan+Putusan+Sebelumnya%2C+Jangan+Langkahi+Kewenang+an+DPR>.
- Rumah Pemilu, dir. *Menakar Pemisahan Pemilu Pasca Putusan MK No 135/PUU/XXII/2024.* 2025. 39:31. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ucYMkAuttiA>.
- Sari, Puji Purnama. "Analisis Komparasi Terhadap Efektivitas Penyelenggaraan Pemilu Serentak Antara Indonesia Dan Brazil." Undergraduate, IAIN Parepare, 2024. <https://repository.iainpare.ac.id/id/eprint/8451/>.
- Silalahi, Elisabeth Felita, and Andina Elok Puri Maharani. "Analisis Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 55/PUU-XVII/2019 Terkait Desain Pemilihan Umum Serentak Guna Mewujudkan Penyelenggaraan Pemilihan Umum Yang Demokratis." *Res Publica: Jurnal Hukum Kebijakan Publik* 5, no. 2 (2021): 2. <https://doi.org/10.20961/respublica.v5i2.58451>.
- Siswanto, Agung, and Zainul Ahwan. "Politik Hiburan Dalam Pemilu: Perolehan Suara Komeng Pada Pemilu 2024." *Al-Tsiqoh : Jurnal Ekonomi Dan Dakwah Islam* 9, no. 1 (2024): 1. <https://doi.org/10.31538/altsiq.v9i1.5434>.
- Sulistiyowati, S., Dewi Nadya Maharani, Gusti Bintang Maharaja, and Hanifa Putri Manoppo. "Refleksi Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Pada Pemilihan Presiden Tahun 2024 Terhadap Politik Dan Demokrasi Indonesia." *Qanuniya : Jurnal Ilmu Hukum* 1, no. 1 (2024): 1. <https://doi.org/10.15575/qanuniya.v1i1.826>.
- Tammu, Lusin. "Analisis Yuridis Konsep Pemilihan Umum Serentak Di Indonesia." *DOKTRINA: JOURNAL OF LAW* 6, no. 2 (2023): 118-39. <https://doi.org/10.31289/doktrina.v6i2.10023>.

Wishnu, Dewanto. "Tinjauan Hukum Implementasi Sistem Demokrasi Pancasila Melalui Pemilihan Umum Langsung Di Indonesia." Other, Universitas Tama Jagakarsa, 2017. <http://digilib.iblam.ac.id/id/eprint/153/>.

Laws and Regulations

the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia

Law No. 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections

Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024